I've put a very early draft of a paper up here. The paper looks at how a believer in classical (or intuitionistic etc.) logic might seek to justify the claim that anything follows from a contradiction to a sceptic. I argue that if the sceptic holds that nothing follows from a contradiction the believer's arguments can be resisted.
Comments welcome - email me.
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Last month the first two events organised under the auspices of the project were hosted at the Leeds Humanities Research Institute. At the student workshop, Current Themes in Philosophical Logic, Berta Grimau introduced plural logic, whilst Graham Priest talked about dialetheism. The following day, the workshop Approaches to Contradiction : Old and New explored several approaches to contradiction. Alexander Douglas talked about Spinoza and the British Idealists, Catarina Dutilh Novaes about Aristotle, and Graham Priest about Hegel and Marx. I provided an overview of the Ex Falso Nihil project, and briefly motivated this approach to contradiction by appeal to the incompatibility of the speech-acts of assertion and denial and a particular account of the relationship between negation and denial. Attendance was good, discussion engaging, and feedback useful! |
AuthorSimon Hewitt, Archives
July 2018
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